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STRETCHING VENUE BEYOND
CONSTITUTIONAL RECOGNITION
United States v. Rodriguez-Moreno, 119 S. Ct. 1239 (1999)
I. INTRODUCTION
In United States v. Rodriguez-Moreno,' the United States Su-
preme Court held that venue for prosecution under 18 U.S.C. §
924(c) (1),2 which makes it a separate crime to use or carry a
firearm during a crime of violence, is proper in any federal ju-
risdictional district where the underlying crime of violence was
committed, regardless of where the firearm was actually used.3
This Note examines the constitutional right to a proper
venue for a criminal prosecution within the context of the con-
stitutionally-accepted practice of enacting federal laws with
broad venue provisions. This Note argues that the Supreme
Court improperly interpreted 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (1) by allowing
the venue to be determined by the underlying violent crime
rather than determining the venue by the nexus between the
violent crime and the use of the firearm.4 In reaching this deci-
sion, this Note argues, the Court undermined the constitutional
right of the accused and engaged in unwarranted judicial legis-
lation. The latter criticism sparked Justice Scalia's pointed dis-
sent, while the former most likely prompted Justice Stevens to
join Justice Scalia in their uncommon alliance.
' 119 S. Ct. 1239 (1999) (ScaliaJ., dissenting).
2 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (1) (1999). Section 924(c) (1) was originally adopted by Con-
gress as part of the Gun Control Act of 1968 and has been subject to subsequent
amendments under the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1968 and the Firearm
Owners' Protection Act of 1986. See infra notes 48-58 and accompanying text.
3 See Rodriguez-Moreno, 119 S. Ct at 1244.
4See id.
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II. BACKGROUND
A. CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO A VENUE WHERE THE CRIME
OCCURS
1. Overview
The United States Constitution explicitly requires crimes to
be tried where they are committed . Article Ill, Section 2 of the
Constitution states that "[t]he Trial of all Crimes, except in
Cases of Impeachment, shall be... held in the State where the
said Crimes shall have been committed .... ,,6 The importance
of this requirement is reinforced by the vicinage7 provision of
the Sixth Amendment, which provides that "[i]n all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein
the crime shall have been committed....",8 The Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure support this constitutional right by pro-
viding that "the prosecution shall be had in a district in which
the offense was committed."9
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, echoing prior Supreme
Court precedent, acknowledged that the constitutional venue
provisions, bolstered by the Federal Rules of Criminal Proce-
'U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 cl. 3.
6 id.
7 Professor Charles Alan Wright succinctly explained the relationship between
venue and vicinage:
Strictly speaking the former constitutional provision [Art. III, Sec. 2, ci. 3] is a venue provi-
sion, since it fixes the place of trial, while the latter [Amendment 6] is a vicinage provision,
since it deal with the place from which the jurors are to be selected. This tedinical distinc-
tion has been of no importance. Although in theory both constitutional provisions could be
satisfied by trying a defendant in one district of a state though the offense was committed
in another district, so long as the jurors were selected from the district of the crime, no
such procedure has ever been attempted, and it has been considered that trial in the dis-
trict of the offense is required.
CHARLES A. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 301, at 579 (1969) (foot-
notes omitted) (emphasis added). See also United States v. Cabrales, 118 S. Ct. 1772,
1774-75 (1998) (finding no distinction between the vicinage and venue provisions of
the Constitution). Unless otherwise noted, this Note will refer to the separate venue
and vicinage provisions as simply the "venue provisions."
" U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI. See also United States v. Anderson, 328 U.S. 699, 703
(1946) (Sixth Amendment's specification "geographic," prescribing trial in the dis-
trict or districts within which offense committed).
9 FED. P_ CRIM. P. 18.
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dure, "reflect that in criminal cases the question of venue is not
a legal technicality, instead it is a significant matter of public
policy."10 Other United States Circuit Courts have concurred in
this sentiment, emphasizing that the right to a proper venue is
of "constitutional dimension" as opposed to a mere formal re-
quirement."
The assertion that venue rights are of a "constitutional di-
mension" is supported by historical justifications. As tensions
mounted between the colonies and Great Britain immediately
prior to the American Revolution, colonial officials representing
the Crown became increasingly concerned that American courts
could not adequately protect royal interests, especially when
American patriots were charged with a crime. 2 Thus, Parlia-
ment revived an ancient statute under which those on colonial
soil (whether colonist or English soldier) could be taken to Eng-
land or another colony for trial.' This practice drew the ire of
the colonists at a time when revolutionist nerves were particu-
larly frayed, thus becoming a precipitating factor in the Ameri-
can Revolution. 4 Thomas Jefferson made specific note of this
perceived royal offense in the Declaration of Independence,
criticizing King George III "for transporting us beyond Seas to
be tried for pretended offenses." 5
Following independence, with the British action still fresh
in the memory of those organizing the new state governments,
several states included state constitutional provisions limiting
criminal prosecutions to the place where the crimes were com-
mitted. 6 After many proposals and little debate, a similar provi-
sion was adopted in the United States Constitution. 17 Because
'0 United States v. Pomranz, 43 F.3d 156, 158 (5th Cir. 1995) (citing United States
v.Johnson, 323 U.S. 273, 276 (1944)).
" See United States v. Palma-Ruedas, 121 F.3d 841, 848 (3d Cir. 1997); see also
United States v. Baxter, 844 F.2d 734, 736 (3d Cir. 1989).
12 See Drew L. Kershen, Vicinage, 29 OKIAL. REv. 803, 805 (1976).
"See id. at 805-06.
SWilliam Wirt Blume, The Place of Trial of Criminal Cases: Constitutional Vicinage and
Venue, 43 MIcH. L. REv. 59, 63-64 (1944).
"71THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, para. 20 (U.S. 1776); See also Albert W. Al-
schuler & Andrew G. Deiss, A Brief Histoy of the CriminalJuty in the United States, 61 U.
CI. L. REv. 867, 875 (1994).
'6 See N.H. CONST. OF 1784, art. I, § 17; MD. CONST. OF 1776, DEC. OF RIGHTS, art.
18; MAss. CONST. OF 1780, PART 1, art. 13.
'7 SeeKershen, supra note 12, at 813.
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the uniformity of acceptance left the historical record bare,'8
one may never know the exact reasons for the Framers' enact-
ment of the venue provisions. Justice Joseph Story, an early
constitutional historian, did advance some possible and prob-
able justifications of the venue provisions:
The object ... is to secure the party accused from being dragged to a
trial in some distant state, away from his friends, witnesses, and neigh-
borhood; and thus subjected to the verdict of mere strangers, who may
feel no common sympathy, or who may even cherish animosities, or
prejudices against him. Besides this; a trial in a distant state or territory
might subject a party to the most oppressive expenses, or perhaps even
to the19inability of procuring proper witnesses to establish his inno-
cence.
Such historically-accepted justifications prompted constitu-
tional scholar Drew Kershen to conclude "that the draftsmen of
Article III, Section 2, clause three intended limited venue to be
of benefit primarily to the accused.
2
0
Just as likely, though, the Framers chose this provision to
help prevent government abuses, for or against the accused.2'
The Declaration of Independence charged the King with "pro-
tecting [troops] by a mock trial, from Punishment for any Mur-
ders which they should commit on the Inhabitants of these
States," 22 allowing a leading commentator to conclude that the
"circumvention of the judgment of the victimized community
was attacked as a 'Mock Trial' system in the Declaration of In-
dependence. 23 The Framers, with recent history of governmen-
tal abuse in mind, recognized that a venue provision would limit
,See Kershen, supra note 12, at 813.
"JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONsrr=TION § 925 (Carolina Academic
Press reprint 1987), reprinted in United States v. Palma Ruedas, 121 F.3d 841, 862
(Alito,J., dissenting).
20 Kershen, supra note 12, at 812-13. See also United States v. Goldberg, 830 F.2d
459, 465 (3d Cir. 1987) ("The venue provisions of the Constitution are important
safeguards, protecting an accused from unfairness and hardship in defending against
prosecution by the federal government.").
2 SeeUnited States v. Palma-Ruedas, 121 F.3d 841, 862 (3d Cir. 1997) (Alito, J., dis-
senting).
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, para. 16 (1776).
"AiL REED AMAR, THE CONSrITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: FIRST PRINcIPLES
124 & n.163 (1997).
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the possible abuse of power otherwise available if one could
manipulate the geographical location of a trial.24
Another compelling justification for the venue provisions,
suggested by more recent scholarship, was that the provisions
protected a community's right to stage the trial of local of-
fenses.25 States have traditionally held the balance of power
within the federal system over shaping criminal statutes in a way
that reflects local preferences.26 As the federal government has
increasingly encroached into this territory, the states, through
the venue provision, have had the consolation of trying the ac-
cused with local juries, thus mirroring, to some extent, local
values in a trial's outcome.27 If the federal government has the
power to choose venue, this consolation to the states is lost.
28
The constitutional venue provisions thus protect at least
three policy interests. First, the venue provisions protect the
rights of the accused.2 The accused is more likely to stand trial
in a familiar or procedurally sound venue: witnesses to the al-
leged crime most likely live in the area of the crime; tangible
evidence of the crime is most often found at the place of the
crime;*°0 and the accused is also more likely to be tried at the ac-
cused's place of residence, allowing for comfort and support of
family and friends and knowledge of local counsel.'1 Second,
federal governmental power against the individual is checked. 2
Limiting venue can help prevent the federal government from
gaining an advantage or leverage that can come with the power
to choose venue in a more or less sympathetic state.3 And, fi-
nally, federal governmental power against the individual states is
curtailed. The venue provisions allow each state the right to
21 See id. at 243; cf. Travis v. United States, 364 U.S. 631, 634 (1961) (venue provi-
sions should not be so freely construed as to give the government the choice of a fa-
vorable venue).




2 See Kershen, supra note 12, at 810.
'o See id. at 810-11.
't See id. at 808-09.
32 See United States v. Palma-Ruedas, 121 F.3d 841, 848 (3d Cir. 1997) (Alito, J., dis-
senting).
"See United States v. Goldberg, 830 F.2d 459, 465 (3d Cir. 1987); see also supra
notes 6-8 and accompanying text.
' See AMAR, supra note 23, at x; see also supra notes 24-27 and accompanying text.
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try the person who actually committed the crime within the
state's territory.35 Judge Alito of the Third Circuit summed up
the prevailing justifications for this constitutional mandate by
stating that the "provisions were meant to put in place impor-
tant substantive protections against government abuse.3 6
2. Constitutionality of Federal Legislation That Broadens Venue
While Congress cannot altogether negate the constitutional
venue guarantee, it can broadly define a crime so that the
commission of the crime could likely cross district and state
borders, thus providing a number of venue choices. And Con-
gress, without constitutional challenge, has explicitly provided
broadened venue provisions for particular offenses, so long as
the venue bears some relation to the offense. Pushing the
borders both constitutionally and geographically of congres-
sional venue-stretching, courts have concluded that venue is
proper in conspiracy cases in any district where an overt act
which furthered the conspiracy happened or anywhere a con-
spiracy agreement was formed. The Supreme Court approved
this rule, permitting trials in districts where defendants have
never stepped foot, despite "its dilutent effect upon venue
rights."40 The Court thus signaled its willingness to weaken
venue rights in order to strengthen Congress's ability to deter
crime.4' Therefore, in order for the judiciary to broadly inter-
pret the criminal venue, Congress must establish a rational
nexus between the crime and the venue within a venue provi-
41sion, or a court must find from the words of the statute that
"5 SeeAMAR, supra note 23, at x.
Palma-Ruedas, 121 F.3d at 861 (Alito,J., dissenting).
37 See United States v. Johnson, 323 U.S. 273, 276 (1944) (reasoning that Congress
can determine where one can commit a crime).
"See 18 U.S.C. § 3237(a) (1994) (continuing offense may be tried "in any district
in which the offense was begun, continued, or completed .... And murder may be
tried in any district were the injury was inflicted... without regard to the place where
the death occurs.").
"' See United States v. Caldwell, 16 F.3d 623, 624 (5th Cir. 1994); see also United
States v. Winship, 724 F.2d 1116, 1125 (5th Cir. 1984).
"' United States v. Pomeranz, 43 F.3d 156, 158 n. 2 (5th Cir. 1995) (citing Winship,
724 F.2d at 1125).
41 See generally id. at 159-60.
12 See, e.g., supra note 38.
956 [Vol. 90
UNITED STATES v. RODRGUEZ-MORENVO
the crime, at least in part, was committed within the court's ju-
risdictional area.3
3. 18 U.S. C. § 924(c)(1) Does Not Have a Specific Venue Provision
The Supreme Court has given Congress a green light to
structure statutes in a way that defines venue broadly enough to
reach criminals with only the slightest of ties to certain geo-
graphical areas. 4 Congress, however, has refrained from plac-
ing a venue provision on 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (1), which would
explicitly allow for the firearm crime to be properly tried in any
venue where the predicate crime was committed. 45 At the time
of Rodriguez-Moreno's offense, the substantive portion of §
924(c) (1) read: "whoever, during and in relation to any crime
of violence or drug trafficking crime . . .uses or carries a fire-
arm, shall, in addition to the punishment provided for such
crime of violence or drug trafficking crime, be sentenced to im-
prisonment for five years .... .46
Although Congress could have, in a separate venue provi-
sion, specifically tied the gun offense with the proper venue of
the underlying drug-trafficking crime, Congress failed to do so.
Furthermore, the congressional history of the statute provides
sparse ground from which explanations for the omission of a
venue provision can be cultivated."
Congress originally adopted § 924(c) (1) as part of the Gun
Control Act of 1968."g This section of the Gun Control Act cre-
ated a separate offense if a gun was either used in the commis-
sion of a felony or was carried unlawfully during the commission
43 See United States v.Johnson, 323 U.S. 273, 276 (1944).
44 See id.
41 See United States v. Palma-Ruedas, 121 F.3d 841, 850 (3d Cir. 1997).
" The statute was amended during appeal, but the amendment is not relevant to
the analysis of this case. See United States v. Rodriguez-Moreno, 119 S. Ct. at 1242 n.3
(citing Pub. L. No. 105-386, 112 Stat. 3469). The amended statute reads: "(A] ny per-
son who, during and in relation to any crime of violence or drug trafficking crime...
uses or carries a firearm, or who, in furtherance of any such crime, possesses a fire-
arm, shall... be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than five years ..
18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (1) (A) (1999).
7 See Palma-Ruedas, 121 F.3d at 850.
48 See Brief for Respondent at 26-27, United States v. Rodriguez-Moreno, 119 S. Ct.
1239 (1999) (No. 97-1139).




of a felony.0 Courts were given wide discretion in setting sen-
tences for this offense (between one and ten years in prison), in
addition to the penalty for the predicate offense. 51
The public's increased dissatisfaction with judicial discre-
tion in sentencing, which paralleled increasing national crime
rates through the 197 0s and 1980s, lead to the Comprehensive
Crime Control Act of 1984, which instituted mandatory mini-
mum sentencing guidelines. 2 The Comprehensive Crime Con-
trol Act amended § 924(c) (1), creating a minimum prison
sentence of five years for "[w] hoever uses or carries a firearm"
during and in relation to any violent crime, in addition to the
prison sentence for the predicate violent crime. 3
Soon after this amendment, courts encountered difficulty
interpreting what constituted a "violent crime," especially in re-
lation to the offense of drug-trafficking. 4 In the majority of
cases, courts decided that drug-trafficking, in itself, was not a
55violent crime. Congress expressed disagreement with the ma-
jority interpretation by amending § 924(c) (1) within the Fire-
arm Owners' Protection Act of 1986 to include as a violent
crime the predicate act of drug-trafficking.56 Congress has since
amended the statute to provide for harsher sentencing depend-
ing on the class of weapon used,57 and most recently amended §
50 See id. The text of the original § 924 (c) (1) states:
Whoever: (1) uses a firearm to commit any felony for which he may be prosecuted in
a court of the United States, or;, (2) carries a firearm unlawfully during the commission of
a felony for which he may be prosecuted in a court of the United States, shall in addition
to the punishment provided for the commission of such felony, be sentenced to a term of
imprisonment for not less than one year nor more than ten years....
51 See id.
12 See Cindy Crane, Note, L. Smith v. United States: Enhanced Penalties For Using
Guns As Barter in Drug Deals, 20J. CONTEMP. L. 295, 299 (1994). But see MichaelJ. Ri-
ordan, Using a Firearm During and in Relation to a Drug Trafficking Crime: Defining the
Elements of the Mandatomy Sentencing Provision of 18 U.S. C. § 924 (c)(1), 30 DUQ. L. REV.
39, 40 (1991) (discussing the failure of increased sentencing to reduce drug related
crime).
18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (1)-(2) (1984).
See Crane, supra note 52, at 299.
s See id; see also United States v. Bushey, 617 F. Supp. 292 (D. Vt. 1985) (conclud-
ing that the combination of drug distribution and guns does not elevate distribution
to the level of a violent crime).
" See 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (1) (1994).
-1 See 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (1) (1990), amended by 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (1) (1994). If the
firearm used in the predicate offense is a short-barreled rifle or shotgun, or a semiau-
tomatic assault weapon, the minimum sentence is ten years; if the firearm is a ma-
958 [Vol. 90
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924(c) (1) to make it a crime to "possess" a firearm in further-
ance of any violent crime or drug-trafficking, in addition to
simply "using" or "carrying" a firearm. 8 This amendment was
made in response to the Supreme Court's relatively narrow in-
terpretation of the word "uses, 5 9 and continues the congres-
sional pattern of building a more inclusive, stiffer statute.
It is widely accepted, drawing from Congress' amendment
pattern of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (1), that the statute reflects con-
gressional concern with high national rates of violent and nar-
cotics-related crime.6' While this is a logical inference, deterring
violent crime was not the primary point of congressional debate
when § 924(c) (1) was enacted as part of the Gun Control Act of
1968.1 What little is recorded of the congressional debate sug-
gests that the focus was whether § 924(c) (1) would be constitu-
tional if applied to state crimes and not on whether this statute
would deter the predicate crimes.2 Thus, it can be logically in-
ferred that Congress enacted § 924(c) (1) not simply to enhance
punishment but with the intention to punish and deter the un-
derlying crime, the illegal use of firearms. 3 Despite the legisla-
tive pattern of expanding the scope of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (1)
through many amendments, Congress has yet to attach a sepa-
rate venue provision.6 Congress has not explicitly tied the fire-
arm offense to any venue where the predicate crime takes place,
though it has the power to do so.65
B. CIRCUIT SPLIT
Before Rodriguez-Moreno was decided by the Supreme Court,
the United States Circuit Courts were divided on whether venue
was proper in any federal jurisdictional district where the under-
chine gun or destructive device, or if the firearm is equipped with a silencer or muf-
fler, the sentence becomes thirty years. See id.
' See Pub. L. 105-386, 112 Stat. 3469 (1998).
'9 SeeBailey v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 501, 506 (1995).
6 See Riordan, supra note 52, at 40; see also Alan M. Gilbert, Note, Defining "Use" of a
Firearm, 87J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 842, 843 (1997).
6, Pub. L. No. 90-618, 82 Stat. 1223-1224 (1968).
62 114 CONG. REc. at 22229-30, 22234. Congress eventually decided to limit §
924(c) (1) to federal crimes. See id.
6' Brief for Respondent at 26, United States v. Rodriguez-Moreno, 119 S. Ct. 1239
(1999) (No. 97-1139).
64 See United States v. Palma Ruedas, 121 F.3d at 841, 850 (3d Cir. 1997).
6 See United States v. Rodriguez-Moreno, 119 S. Ct. 1239, 1242 n.1 (1999).
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lying crime of violence was committed in a § 924(c) (1) offense,
regardless of where the firearm was actually used. The Third
Circuit, in which Rodriguez-Moreno was tried, carefully examined
two previous cases from sister circuits which provided opposing
venue analyses to § 924(c) (1): United States v. Corona, and
United States v. Pomranz.
6 1
1. United States v. Corona
In United States v. Corona,6 the defendant was tried in Ne-
vada and convicted of both conspiracy to distribute cocaine and
the substantive crimes associated with the conspiracy, which in-
cluded the distribution of cocaine and the use of a firearm dur-
ing the distribution.6 Both the distribution of the cocaine and
the use of the firearm occurred only in California, though overt
acts of conspiracy happened in both California and Nevada.0
On appeal the defendant argued that venue for the substantive
offenses, including the § 924(c) (1) charge, was improper in Ne-
vada.7
The Ninth Circuit conducted a separate venue analysis for
the conspiracy and the substantive crimes, determining that
venue was improper in Nevada for the substantive offenses.72
The court adopted the "verb test" and thus examined the verbs
of the § 924(c) (1) offense to determine where Congress ex-
pected proper venue to lie. 3 Finding that one could only "use"
or "carry" a gun in violation of § 924(c) (1) when in connection
with the substantive predicate offense, the Ninth Circuit held
that prosecution in a venue where the underlying conspiracy
charge took place is not proper under § 924(c) (1) if the
weapon was not used or carried in that venue. 74 The Ninth Cir-
cuit in Corona did not examine the government's policy con-
cerns, nor did it pay heed to any extrapolation of congressional
34 F.3d 876 (9th Cir. 1994).
67 43 F.3d 156 (5th Gir. 1995).
6' 34 F.3d 876 (9th Cir. 1994).
69 See id. at 877-78.
70 See id.
71 See id.
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intent, but, rather, the court conducted the venue analysis
based on the statute as written by Congress. 75
Acknowledging the possible public policy difficulties inher-
ent in its decision, the court stated "while [tying venue to the
underlying offense] might make some sense from a policy
standpoint, it runs counter to the venue principles established
by the Constitution, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,
and the federal courts." 76 Furthermore, the court noted that the
government "could have and should have" litigated all of the of-
fenses in California.77 The court concluded that because public
policy concerns are insufficient to overrule constitutional prin-
ciples, 78 a conviction under § 924(c) (1) could not be prosecuted
where the conspiracy occurred if the firearm was not used or
carried in that venue.
2. United States v. Pomranz
In United States v. Pomranz,0 the defendant was charged with
several counts relating to the distribution of marijuana, includ-
ing the use of a gun in connection with the underlying crime of
drug distribution.81 The drug trafficking occurred in North
Texas, while the firearm was used in Oklahoma City.82 After be-
ing convicted on all counts in a North Texas trial, the defendant
appealed. 3 Citing Corona, the defendant argued that the
proper venue to try the § 924(c) (1) offense was Oklahoma
City.
84
The Fifth Circuit disagreed.85 The court explicitly rejected
the Ninth Circuit's reasoning, and stated that the court's analy-
sis would "effectively undermine the Congressional intent to
curb the violence inherently associated with high-level drug
deals. ' The court observed the consistent increase in deter-
75 See id. at 878-81.
76 Id. at 879.
"Id. at 881.
7" See id. at 879.
79 See id. at 881.
8" 43 F.3d 156 (5th Cir. 1995).
"' See id. at 157.
12 See id. at 158.
See id. at 157.
"See id. at 159.




rence value throughout the § 924(c) (1) amendments,87 and
noted that the legislation's sponsor, United States Representa-
tive Richard Poff, explained that one of the statute's objectives
was to "persuade a man who is tempted to commit a federal fel-
ony to leave his gun at home. '' m The Fifth Circuit therefore
concluded that Congress intended § 924(c) (1) to provide "a
maximum deterrence a~anst using firearms" during the com-
mission of other crimes.
The court did not analyze the words of the statute itself, but
instead concluded that, unless venue is constructed broadly, the
congressional intent of deterring violence "inherently associated
with high-level drug deals" would be undermined. 90 Placing the
goal of deterrence above all other considerations, the court ac-
knowledged that policy concerns, particularly the possible addi-
tional costs the government might incur in prosecuting a
convicted felon a second time, were paramount. 1 To provide
maximum deterrence at minimum prosecutorial cost, the court
determined that a § 924(c) (1) violation is sufficiently inter-
twined with the predicate act of drug trafficking or committing
a violent crime as to warrant trial in the same venue, regardless
of where the firearm was actually used or carried.
92 Cognizant
of the constitutional concerns inherent in its decision, the court
noted: "[W] e do not believe that our holding seriously infringes
on the defendant's rights since this Court treats the right to
venue with less deference than other constitutional 
rights. 9 3
While the court gave examples of when venue rights were
treated with less deference than other constitutional rights in
17 See id. at 160. The court noted that Congress first amended § 924(c) to make
clear that the defendant was sentenced under both the predicate offense and the gun
offense: "[T]he statute underwent further changes to increase the severity of pun-
ishment by: (1) requiring that the mandatory sentence run consecutively rather than
concurrently with the predicate crime, (2) substantially increasing the mandatory
penalty violations, and (3) denying parole or probation privileges during the §
924(c) (1) sentence." Id.
Id. at 160 n.5 (quoting 114 CONG. REC. 22, 231 (1968)).




93 Id. at 162.
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the Fifth Circuit,94 the court failed to give reasons for delegating
venue to the bottom of its constitutional hierarchy.9 5
The two opposing opinions from the Ninth and Fifth Cir-
cuits, set the stage for the Third Circuit's adjudication of Rodri-
guez-Moreno's appeal in the Palma-Ruedas case.96
III. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A. FACTS
In July 1994, Ephrain Avendano introduced the leader of a
Texas cocaine distribution ring, Omar Torres-Montalvo, to
Fanol Ochoa, a New York drug dealer, facilitating a relationship
between the distributor and the dealer.97 Avendano was to serve
as middleman between Torres-Montalvo and Ochoa.8
In October 1994, the first attempted transaction in this new
business relationship was foiled when two of Torres-Montalvo's
runners were arrested while en route to New York, and fourteen
kilograms of cocaine were seized.09 Torres-Montalvo expressed
to Avendano that he was displeased with the seizure of the mer-
chandise and with the legal fees of his employee.'0° He also ex-
pressed that he needed to make a new deal to compensate for
his "big loss. '' 1°1 Avendano relayed this information to Ochoa,
who agreed to another deal with Torres-Montalvo, this time for
thirty kilograms.0 2 Torres-Montalvo insisted that the deal would
take place in Texas.03 Avendano, acting as middleman, met
with Ochoa and another man named "Baldy" at an airport in
' See id. The court explained that "the standard for finding a waiver of venue is
much more relaxed than the rigorous standard for finding waivers of the right to trial
by jury, the right to confront one's accusers or the privilege against compulsory self
incrimination." Id. (quoting United States v. Winship, 724 F.2d 1116, 1124 (5th Cir.
1984)).
o See id.
See United States v. Palma-Ruedas, 121 F.3d 841, 848 (3d Cir. 1997).










Houston. For "reasons of security" Ochoa would not meet
with Torres-Montalvo personally. 1 5 Instead, the plan was that
Avendano and Baldy would meet Torres-Montalvo.1 6 Baldy
would then put the cocaine in his car, Avendano would call
Ochoa, and Ochoa would then deliver the money.10 7 The first
part of this plan went smoothly. The cocaine was delivered to
Baldy's car by Torres-Montalvo and Baldy drove away with the
drugs.
08
The second part of the plan, though, did not fare as well for
Torres-Montalvo: Ochoa never answered his pager.1°9 Torres-
Montalvo felt Avendano was responsible for the loss, and de-
cided to hold Avendano physically until either the merchandise
or the money was recovered.' 0
Hearing rumors that Ochoa was in New York bragging
about his clever acquisition, Torres-Montalvo decided to use
Avendano's NewJersey apartment as home base while searching
for Ochoa in New York."' Torres-Montalvo hired four men,
Pacheco, Ortiz, Palma-Ruedas, and Rodriguez-Morano, to find
Ochoa and keep Avendano captive."' The four men drove to
Avendano's place in NewJersey."8 After hearing that police had
noticed their Texas license plates in Avendano's driveway, the
group headed to Maryland and arrived at a house owned by
Morillo, an acquaintance of Torres-Montalvo. 14 While there,
Morillo showed off his .357 magnum revolver to the group.'15 In
the meantime, Torres-Montalvo continued his search for
Ochoa."6 As time passed, and Torres-Montalvo's search proved
fruitless, tensions mounted between the kidnappers and their
,' Brief for the United States at 4, United States v. Rodriguez-Moreno, 119 S. Ct.
1239 (1999) (No. 97-1139).
'0 Palmas-R-udas, 121 F.3d at 845.
"6 See id. at 846.
'07 See id. at 845-46.
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captive . 17 At one point Rodriguez-Moreno put Morillo's gun to
the back of Avendano's neck, telling Torres-Montalvo that "they
were just wasting time" and that they should "get it over with
and just kill Avendano." 8 After Torres-Montalvo and the others
talked Rodriguez-Moreno out of this drastic action, Avendano
managed to escape from the back of the house and contacted
his wife, who contacted the police.""
The police secured a search warrant for the Maryland prop-
erty, entered the house, and arrested Torres-Montalvo and his
search party."' The police also seized the .357 magnum, which
was covered with Rodriguez-Moreno's fingerprints.
B. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
1. District Court
Rodriguez-Moreno and his co-defendants were tried in the
United States District Court of New Jersey.22 All were charged
with conspiring to kidnap Avendano."2 Rodriguez-Moreno was
also charged with using and carrying a firearm in relation to
Avendano's kidnapping, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (1).124
At the conclusion of the government's case, Rodriguez-Moreno
moved to dismiss the § 924(c) (1) count for lack of venue, argu-
ing venue was only proper in Maryland on the firearm count, as
that was the only place where the government proved that he
actually used a gun."' Because this was an issue of first impres-
sion in the Third Circuit, the District Court, in an unpublished
opinion, looked to the two opposing analyses offered by the
Ninth and Fifth Circuits.26 Apparently persuaded by the Fifth
Circuit's reasoning that a defendant is properly tried for unlaw-
ful use of a firearm in any district in which the venue is estab-
117 See id.
"8Id.
", Brief for the United States at 5, United States v. Rodriguez-Moreno, 119 S. Ct.
1239 (1999) (No. 97-1139).
20 See id. at 5-6.
121 See id. at 6.




126 See id.; see also supra Part II.B.
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lished for the underlying violent offense, the district court con-
cluded that it was proper to try Rodriguez-Moreno in New Jer-
sey. 27 Rodriguez-Moreno was sentenced to 87 months in prison
for the kidnapping charges and to a mandatory consecutive
term of 60 months in prison for the § 924(c) (1) offense. 28
2. United States v. Palma-Ruedas
All six defendants appealed from the decision of the district
court, and the Third Circuit consolidated their appeals.'9 The
court first examined Rodriguez-Moreno's contention that New
Jersey was not the proper venue in which to prosecute him for
the § 924(c) (1) offense.3 0 In a two-to-one decision, the Third
Circuit agreed with Rodriguez-Moreno and reversed the hold-
ing of the lower court.13 ' The Third Circuit sided with the statu-
tory analysis provided by the Ninth Circuit in Corona, rather
than with the Fifth Circuit's public policy analysis.32 In analyz-
ing the proper venue under § 924(c) (1), the court first adopted
the "verb test," also used by the Corona court, as an aid in de-
termining where Congress intended venue to lie.' Applying
the verb test to § 924(c) (1), the majority of the Third Circuit
panel determined that violation of the statute is committed only
where the defendant actually "uses" or "carries" a firearm. 1
The court then addressed the constitutional concerns involved
when issues of venue arise.1'5 Examining the history and histori-
cal justifications of the constitutional venue provisions, the
court determined that this constitutional right deserved greater
deference than the Fifth Circuit would have provided.36 Finally,
2 See Palmas-Ruedas, 121 F.3d at 847.
'2 SeeUnited States v. Rodriguez-Moreno, 119 S. Ct. 1239, 1242 (1999).
'2 See Palma-Ruedas, 121 F.3d at 846.
' See id. at 850-51.
131 See id.
132 See id. at 849.
"' See id. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
" Palma-Ruedas, 121 F.3d at 850.
's See id.
1 See id. The court referred to the Fifth Circuit's finding that the Fifth Circuit
treats venue provisions with less deference than other constitutional provisions, see
United States v. Pomranz, 43 F.3d 156, 162 (1995), then later found that the Third
Circuit has afforded the venue provisions the same weight as other constitutional
guarantees for criminal defendants, acknowledging that "these guarantees form the
bedrock principles of our criminal justice system and should not be hastily balanced
away." Palma-Ruedas, 121 F.3d at 850.
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the court looked to the congressional history of § 924(c) (1) and
found that there was not enough evidence of congressional in-
tent to broaden the venue in such cases to overcome the consti-
tutional concerns. 7  The Third Circuit panel therefore
concluded that because Rodriguez-Moreno only used the gun in
Maryland, New Jersey was not the proper venue for the §
924(c) (1) count"
a. The Verb Test
The court began its analysis of proper venue by examining
the verbs for clues as to where Congress intended venue to lie.'
In applying the verb test, the Third Circuit found that §
924(c) (1) is unambiguous in designating the criminal conduct
that is prohibited: "using" or "carrying" a firearm. 40 Thus, "one
commits a violation of § 924(c) (1) in the district where one
'uses' or 'carries' a firearm.0 41 Because Rodriguez-Moreno only
used a firearm in Maryland, the court concluded that he com-
mitted the § 924(c) (1) offense only in Maryland and should be
tried for that particular offense in the proper Maryland venue.4 2
The Third Circuit acknowledged that, when the verbs in
statutes defining criminal conduct are ambiguous, the verb test
might not always be appropriate.4  But the court found the
verbs defining the criminal conduct in § 924(c) (1) to be
straightforward, and thus use of the verb test was considered
proper. 14' The verb test has been adopted as an interpretive
venue-determining tool in at least half of the federal circuits.
137 See id.
"3 See id. at 850-51.
"' See id. at 850. This verb test, introduced by Armistead M. Dobie in an influential
article, Venue in Criminal Cases in the United States District Court, 12 VA. L. REv. 287, 289
(1926), suggests that "[a]ll federal crimes are statutory, and these crimes are often
defined ... in terms of a single verb. That essential verb usually contains the key to
the solution of the question: in what district was the crime committed?" Id.
", Palma-Ruedas, 121 F. 3d at 849.
141 Id.
142 See id.
141 See id. at 850 n.6.
'4 See id. at 850 & n.6
"3 See generally United States v. Murphy, 117 F.3d 137, 139 (4th Cir. 1997) ("Where
, Congress has not provided an express venue provision in conjunction with a
criminal statute, this circuit has looked to the verbs defining the criminal offense and
the purpose underlying the criminal statute to determine proper venue."); United
States v. Crawford, 115 F.3d 1397, 1405 (8th Cir. 1997) (applying the "key verb" test
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b. Deference Toward Upholding the Constitution
The Third Circuit not only worried about the statutory in-
terpretation of § 924(c) (1), but also expressed concern with the
constitutional implications of judicially broadening venue.1
4 6
While the government argued that a strict interpretation of
venue would cause undue hardship, the Third Circuit noted
that the government could have tried Rodriguez-Moreno on
both the predicate crime and the separate firearm crime in a
single trial in Maryland.14 7 While acknowledging the potential
administrative efficiency, and thus the policy persuasiveness, in-
herent in the government's argument, the court emphasized
that many constitutional guarantees for criminal defendants are
inefficient and costly, such as the right to counsel.14 8 "Neverthe-
less, these guarantees form the bedrock principles of our crimi-
nal justice system and should not be hastily balanced away.',
49
The Third Circuit thus affirmed that constitutional guarantees
should trump administrative efficiency. 50
c. Congressional History Analysis of § 924(c) (1)
Recognizing that Congress does have the power to broaden
venue in a constitutionally acceptable manner, the court exam-
ined the possibility that Congress intended for the venue of the
firearm offense to be appropriate in any venue where the un-
derlying crime is appropriate.' Because Congress could have
enacted a provision tying the venue of the gun crime to the
to the Child Support Recovery Act); United States v. Corona, 34 F.3d 876, 879-80 (9th
Cir. 1994) (adopting verb test as an interpretive tool); United States v Cofield, 11
F.3d 413, 416 (4th Cir. 1994) (remarking that "we have adopted the 'verb test' as an
interpretive aid"); United States v. Georgacarakos, 988 F.2d 1289, 1293 (1st Cir. 1993)
("To determine venue, we examine the key verbs in the statute defining the criminal
offense to find the scope of the relevant conduct.") (internal quotes omitted); United
States v. Ryan, 894 F.2d 355, 360 (10th Cir. 1990) ("Courts usually examine the verbs
employed in the statute to define the offense.").
'6 See Palma-Ruedas, 121 F.3d at 850.
'7 See id. at 849-50. The government argued that Rodriguez-Moreno could be tried
only in NewJersey or New York on the charge of kidnapping Mr. Avendano, and this
would not allow for a consolidated trial on all the charges in Maryland. The court
unsympathetically replied that the "separate crime of kidnaping Mr. Avendano is not
particularly relevant to our venue analysis." Id. at 850 n.5.
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predicate offense but did not, the court concluded the strict
language of the statute and the constitutional concerns were
controlling.152 The court reasoned that if the statute does not
indicate location of the crime for determining venue, the verbs
must be strictly construed to ensure that the defendant's Sixth
Amendment rights are protected."' 3
d. Dissent
Though conceding that the verb test may be one tool in de-
termining where venue should lie, Judge Alito, in dissent, ar-
gued that this should not be the sole test.54 Instead, the court
should look to "the substance of the statutes in question," rather
than relying on "grammatical arcana."155 Judge Alito argued
that one should first look to the nature of the crime as defined
116by the statute. In this case, the nature of the crime was using a
firearm in conjunction with the underlying crime of violence or
drug trafficking. 57 Because the underlying crime is a critical
element of the separate gun offense, Judge Alito argued, venue
is constitutionally accegtable wherever the venue for the predi-
cate offense is proper.
The dissent bolstered this analysis by arguing that defining
venue broadly in this case is supported by the legislative history
of § 924(c)(1).'- 9 Representative Poff, the statute's sponsor,
stated that "the prosecution for the basic felony and the prose-
cution under my substitute would constitute one proceeding
out of which two separate penalties would grow."'' 6 Thus, Con-
11 See id. (citing United States v. Anderson, 328 U.S. 699, 703 (1946), which held that
when "nothing in either the statute or the legislative history... show[s] an intention
on the part of Congress to depart from the Sixth Amendment's command," courts
must determine venue by looking to the nature of the crime and where it was com-
mitted).
" See id. (citing United States v.Johnson, 323 U.S. 273, 276 (1944), which concluded
that "[i]f an enactment of Congress equally permits the underlying spirit of the con-
stitutional concern for trial in the vicinage to be respected rather than to be disre-
spected, construction should go in the direction of constitutional policy.. .").
... See id. at 859, 862 (Alito,J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
15 See id. at 865 (AlitoJ., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
16 See id. at 859 (Alito,J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
,17 See id. (Alito,J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
1 See id. (Alito,J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
59 See id. at 863 (AlitoJ., concurring in part, dissenting in part).




gress emphasized the importance of the underlying crime to the
§ 924(c) (1) offense, which, according to Judge Alito, helps es-
tablish the propriety of tying venue to the predicate offense.6
The dissenting judge argued further that the courts have ac-
knowledged the intimacy with which the firearm offense and
predicate offense have been congressionally wed by holding that
only one gun crime can be appended to a single underlying
crime.162
Finally, Judge Alito insightfully noted that a defendant is
just as likely to have significant ties to where she commits the
underlying crime of violence or drug-trafficking, as she is to
where the gun offense occurs,163 thus effectively undermining
the argument for separating venue based on the traditional jus-
tification of placing the trial in a familiar place for the ac-
cused.16 Therefore, Judge Alito reasoned that it is not offensive
to the Constitution to tie the venue to the predicate crime when
charged with a § 924(c) (1) offense. 0
The government, noting that the Third Circuit's holding
was in conflict with a Fifth Circuit decision, 1 petitioned for re-
view.161 The Supreme Court granted certiorari on June 8,
1998.'6
'6' See id. (Alito,J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
1612 See id. at 862-63 (Alito, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (citing United
States v. Cappas, 29 F.3d 1187, 1189 (7th Cir. 1994); United States v. Lindsay, 985
F.2d 666, 674 (2d Cir. 1993); United States v. Sims, 975 F.2d 1225, 1233 (6th Cir.
1992); United States v. Moore, 958 F.2d 310, 312 (10th Cir. 1992); United States v.
Hamilton, 953 F.2d 1344, 1346 (11th Cir. 1992); United States v. Privette, 947 F.2d
1259, 1262-63 (5th Cir. 1991); United States v. Fontanilla, 849 F.2d 1257, 1258-59 (9th
Cir. 1988); but seeUnited States v. Lucas, 932 F.2d 1210, 1222-23 (8th Cir. 1991)).
63 See id. at 863 (Alito,J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
See id. (Alito,J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
6 See id. (Alito, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
'6 See United States v. Pomranz, 43 F.3d 156 (5th Cir. 1995).
'67 United States v. Rodriguez-Moreno, 119 S. Ct. 1239, 1242 (1999).
'6 United States v. Rodriguez-Moreno, 118 S. Ct. 2296 (1999).
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IV. THE SUPREME COURT OPINION
A. MAJORITY OPINION
Justice Thomas, writing for the majority, 69 concluded that
venue was proper in a prosecution under § 924(c) (1) in any
federal jurisdiction where the underlying crime was committed,
and, therefore, venue in this case was proper in NewJersey.
7 0
Following recent precedent, Justice Thomas noted that the
"locus delicti [of the charged offense] must be determined from
the nature of the crime alleged and the location of the act or
acts constituting it."'7' Thus, a court first must identify the
criminal conduct and then "discern the location of the criminal
acts.' 72
Though acknowledging that the Third Circuit's verb test
can be a useful tool in determining venue, the majority none-
theless submitted that the Court has "never before held.., that
the verbs are the sole consideration in identifying the conduct
that constitutes an offense."73 In this case, the Court expressed
concern that because "the crime of violence element of the
statute is embedded in a prepositional phrase and not ex-
pressed in verbs," the Third Circuit overlooked the essential
conduct element of the statute. Thus, the majority found that
the verb test, applied rigidly, unduly limits the inquiry about the
nature of the offense, which creates a concern that statutorily
prohibited conduct may be missed.7 5
Justice Thomas explained that § 924(c) (1) contains two dis-
tinct conduct elements: "using and carrying" a gun and the
commission of the violent crime. 76 Therefore, the government
had only to prove that a firearm was used "during and in rela-
tion to" the acts constituting kidnapping in the course of a drug
169 Rehnquist, CJ., and O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsberg, and Breyer, JJ.,
joined in this opinion. Rodriguez-Moreno, 119 S. Ct. at 1241.
170 See id. at 1244.
17 Id. at 1243 (quoting United States v. Cabrales, 524 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1998) (quoting
United States v. Anderson, 328 U.S. 699, 703 (1946))).
17'2 Id.
'73 Id. at 1242.
174 Id.
175 See id.
176 See id at 1243.
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transaction.1 7 7 Rodriguez-Moreno contended that the firearm
crime was not relevant to the New Jersey kidnapping crime be-
cause he never used the firearm in NewJersey. The Court re-
sponded first that § 924(c) (1) does not define a "goint-in-time"
offense, as the crime may cover several districts. A kidnap-
ping, the predicate crime, once begun, ends only when the vic-
tim is free, thus it makes no sense to think of the crime in
geographic fragments."" Because § 924(c) (1) makes it a crime
to use a firearm "during and in relation to" the predicate of-
fense, if the gun was used "during and in relation" to the kid-
napping, the § 924(c) (1) crime carries throughout the
kidnapping. 181
Second, the Court addressed its holding in United States v.
Lombardo,82 and agreed that "where a crime consists of distinct
parts which have different localities the whole may be tried
where any part can be proved to have been done."'8 3 Justice
Thomas implied by citing Lombardo that § 924(c) (1) may be
tried wherever it is proper to try either of the two distinct parts:
the firearm offense and the violent crime offense. Further-
more, § 924(c) (1) creates a unitary continuing crime of distinct
parts. ts Congress has provided that any continuing offenses can
be prosecuted "in any district in which such offense was begun,
continued, or completed., 186  Therefore, the majority con-
cluded, it is proper to prosecute the defendant in any district
where the underlying crime was committed, so long as the gun
offense was committed "during and in relation to" the underly-
ing offense."" The Supreme Court held that, because it was
S77 see id.
See Respondent's Brief at 12, Rodriguez-Moreno (No. 97-1139).
'9 See Rodriguez-Moreno, 119 S. Ct. at 1243-44 (noting that several Circuits have de-
termined kidnapping to be a unitary crime, including United States v. Seals, 130 F.3d
451, 461-62 (D.C. Cir. 1997); United States v. Denny-Shaffer, 2 F.3d 999, 1018-19 (10th
Cir. 1993); United States v. Godinez, 998 F.2d 471, 473 (7th Cir. 1993); and United States
v. Garcia, 854 F.2d 340, 343-44 (9th Cir. 1988)).
"' See id at 1244.
181 See id.
,12 United States v. Lombardo, 241 U.S. 73 (1916).
18 See Rodriguez-Moreno, 119 S. Ct. at 1243-44 (citing Lombardo, 241 U.S. at 77).
184 See id.
185 See id.
18' 18 U.S.C. § 3237(a) (1994).
Rodriguez-Moreno, 119 S. Ct. at 1243.
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proper to try the kidnapping in New Jersey, the § 924(c) (1) of-
fense could be tried there as well.1 8
The majority opinion acknowledged the venue provisions
within the Constitution,"" but did not examine the case in light
of constitutional analysis, 19 despite the substantial constitutional
examination conducted by the Third, Fifth, and Ninth Cir-
cuits.19' The Court also failed to discuss any implications that
may stem from this opinion when lower courts analyze venue• • .I -, -192
provisions in the future.
B. DISSENT
Justice Scalia 193 agreed with the majority that one must look
at "the nature of the crime alleged and the location of the act or
acts constituting it."'19  He disagreed, though, that the §
924(c) (1) crime is committed "either where the defendant
commits the predicate offense or where he uses or carries the
gun. ' 95 The crime can be committed, Scalia contended, only
where the "defendant both engages in the acts making up the
predicate offense and uses or carries the gun.,
196
The majority, according to the dissent, mistakenly relied on
Lombardo, which held that if a crime has distinct parts which
have been committed in different localities, the crime may be
tried in any locality where any one part can be proved to have
been done. 7 Justice Scalia said the reliance on Lombardo is un-
warranted here because Rodriguez-Moreno's alleged crime did
not consist of "distinct" parts that occurred in two separate
places.' 98 Rather, Justice Scalia noted "[i]ts two parts are bound
inseparably together by the word 'during. ' '' 19'
"a See id. at 1244.
..9 See id. at 1242.
"' See id. at 1242-44.
' See United States v. Palma-Ruedas, 121 F.3d 841, 849-50 (3d Cir. 1997); United
States v. Pomranz, 43 F.3d 156, 158-61 (5th Cir. 1995); United States v. Corona, 34
F.3d 876, 878-79 (9th Cir. 1994).
"92 See Rodriguez-Moreno, 119 S. Ct. at 1242-44.
'"Justice Stevensjoined Justice Scalia's dissent. Id. at 1244.
"Id. (Scalia,J., dissenting).
," Id. (ScaliaJ., dissenting).
Id. (ScaliaJ., dissenting).
'97 See id. at 1245 (Scalia, J., dissenting).




The dissent agreed with the majority that both the kidnap-
ping and the use of the gun are not in themselves "point-in-
time" offenses, as they both can extend over a protracted period
of time and to several places. ° Section 924(c) (1), though, can
be violated only where both acts happen simultaneously, argued
Justice Scalia, who pointedly proclaimed that "[t]his is what the
,,201 oteword 'during' means. In other words, § 924(c) (1), like the
crime of kidnapping, has the potential to cross venue borders,
but only if the gun is actually used during the crossing. 
202
Thus, Scalia wrote, the defendant "who has a constitutional
right to be tried in the State and district where his alleged crime
was 'committed,'... has been prosecuted for using a gun during
a kidnaping in a State and district where all agree he did not use
a gun during a kidnaping."2 3 The dissent closed by implying
that this should have been a simple case if the analysis was based
on the text, commenting that "[i]f to state this case is not to de-
cide it, the law has departed further from the meaning of lan-
guage than is appropriate for a government that is supposed to
rule (and to be restrained) through the written word.'',2
Justice Scalia, like the majority, refrained from analyzing the
constitutional aspects of this case.05 It is unclear whether the
dissent believed the case simply could be decided on statutory
interpretation, or if it believed constitutional analysis to be un-
warranted.
V. ANALYSIS
The dissent correctly concluded that the majority failed to
properly interpret the language of the statute. But the dis-
sent, by declining to place the interpretation of the statute
within the context of constitutional venue analysis,0 7 faltered
before reaching a fully satisfying critique of the majority's ques-
tionable decision. This analysis seeks to bolster the dissent's
conclusion, first by explaining why the dissent's statutory inter-
2' See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
21, Id. (ScaliaJ., dissenting).
202 See id. (ScaliaJ., dissenting).
.0. Id. at 1245-46 (ScaliaJ., dissenting).
2o1 Id. at 1246 (ScaliaJ., dissenting).
211 See id. at 1244-46 (ScaliaJ., dissenting).
206 See id. (ScaliaJ., dissenting).
207 See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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pretation of § 924(c) (1) is more sound than that of the major-
ity, second by addressing the proper context for use of legisla-
tive history and the verb test in interpreting § 924(c) (1), and
third by answering the constitutional question of why the Court
should have, within the context of § 924(c) (1), boldly guarded
the now vulnerable venue provisions.
A. STATUTORY ANALYSIS
1. The Court Mistakenly Concluded that § 924(c)(1) Has 'Distinct Parts"
Although the majority opinion claims otherwise, 28 §
924(c) (1) does not embody two distinct criminal elements, ei-
ther of which, when violated, could provide a choice of venue in
201which the government could properly prosecute. The major-
ity started the statutory interpretation correctly.210  First, the
Court "identif [ied] the conduct constituting the offense" and
then "discern[ed] the location of the commission of the crimi-
nal acts., 21 But the majority then proceeded to misidentify "the
conduct constituting the offense" 2 by implicating two distinct
conduct elements within § 924(c) (1): the commission of the
violent crime of kidnapping and "the using and carrying" of a
gun.2 ' But the language of the statute speaks only of one ele-
ment of the crime: '"hoever, during and in relation to any
crime of violence ... uses or carries a firearm, shall.., be sen-
tenced to imprisonment for five years .... Justice Scalia,
with a keen eye for the linguistically obvious, correctly argued
that the gun violation can be committed only if the gun is used
during the offense.215 Thus, § 924(c) (1) has only one conduct
element: using or carrying the gun while committing a violent
216crime. If either part is performed separately, the § 924(c) (1)
208 See id. at 1244.
21 See id. at 1245. (ScaliaJ., dissenting).
210 See id. at 1242.
211 See id. (applying the test first announced in United States v. Anderson, 328 U.S.
699, 703 (1946), and most recently affirmed in United States v. Cabrales, 524 U.S. 1, 6-7
(1998)).212 See id.
212 See id. at 1243.
2" 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (1) (1994).
211 See Rodriguez-Moreno, 119 S. Ct. at 1244 (ScaliaJ., dissenting).
211 See id. at 1245 (Scalia,J., dissenting).
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offense is never committed.217 Justice Scalia properly concluded
that "[w] here the gun is being used, the predicate act must be
occurring as well, and vice-versa."2 1 8 The statute cannot logically
be read another way as the violent offense and the gun posses-
sion have to coincide before a § 924(c) (1) offense is commit-
ted.2 19
To avoid the problem of explaining the illogical, the major-
ity simply never addressed the problem posed by the word "dur-
ing. Instead, in explaining how the statute has "distinct
parts," as required by the Lombardo analysis, the Court conclu-
sively noted the two elements of the crime.22 1 By interpreting §
924(c) (1)'s "conduct element" as having two distinct parts, the
majority, in effect, wrote the word "during" out of the statute.2 2
This is troubling, as Congress is the more appropriate institu-
tion to make such an important statutory revision.
Because § 924(c) (1) does not have distinct parts (the crime
can only be committed where the underlying act of violence is
accompanied by a firearm), the Court's reliance on Lombardo
for the proposition that, if a crime consists of distinct parts, the
venue may lie where any part can be proved224 is therefore mis-
taken. Section 924(c) (1) is not violated until both the use of
the gun and the predicate crime coincide, an unhappy coinci-
dence which apparently only happened in Maryland.
2. Congressional Intent Does Not Justify the Court's Conclusion
that Venue was Proper in NewJersey
The majority declined to justify a relaxed construction of §
924(c) (1) based on congressional intent, although it was vigor-
ously argued by the government.2 There are two possible rea-
sons for this omission. First, Justice Thomas prefers to rely on
217 See id. (ScaliaJ., dissenting).
218 Id. (ScaliaJ., dissenting).
219 See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
220 See id. at 1243.
221 See id. at 1244.
Id. at 1244 (ScaliaJ., dissenting).
22 See id. at 1246 (ScaliaJ., dissenting).
'4 Id. at 1247.
See United States v. Palma-Ruedas, 121 F.3d 841, 846 (3d Cir. 1997).
2'6 See United States' Brief at 21-22, Rodriguez-Moreno (No. 97-1139).
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statutory language. 7 Second, the government's congressional
intent argument was weak, and therefore would not advance the
majority's opinion a.2 2  The government argued that, because
Congress was concerned about the proliferation of violence
when it first enacted § 924(c) (1) and as it passed subsequent
amendments to that section, Congress must have meant for
both the underlying crime and the use of a firearm to be dis-
tinct elements. This argument echoes a proposition in the
Palma-Ruedas dissent, which stated that "a central focus, if not
the central focus, of the statute is the commission of the under-
lying crime."2 '0
Congress, though, enacted § 924(c) (1) as part of the Gun
Control Act of 1968,2" creating a more logical inference that
Congress enacted § 924(c) (1) with the intention of punishing
the illegal use of firearms and not simply to enhance punish-
ment for the underlying crime. 2 What little is recorded of the
congressional debate focuses on whether § 924(c) (1) would be
constitutional if applied to state crimes and not on whether this
statute would deter the predicate crimes.233 While Representa-
tive Poff, the statute's sponsor, made statements that would lead
one to reasonably infer the statute was enacted for reasons of
deterrence, 4 it would be unreasonable to further infer that
Congress intended the predicate offense and firearm offense to
be distinct elements.35
22 Cf City of Edmonds v. Oxford House, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 1776, 1783-87 (1995)
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (expressing concern that the majority was willing to intrude
upon statutory plain meaning without a clear statement of Congress's intentions
while asserting that his reading of the statute allowed him to avoid considering
whether legislative history was "either authoritative or persuasive").
2" See United States' Brief at 21-25, Rodriguez-Moreno (No. 97-1139).
229 See id. at 21-22.
m Palma-Ruedas, 121 F.3d at 862.
2" Pub. L. No. 90-618, 82 Stat. 1223-1224. (1968).
222 Respondent's Brief at 26-27, Rodriguez-Moreno (No. 97-1139).
2 See 114 CONG. REc. 22,229-22,234 (1968). Congress eventually decided to limit
§ 924(c) (1) to federal crimes. See 18 U.S.C. § 924 (1999).
See 114 CONG. REc. 22,231 (1968) (explaining that the provision was meant to
persuade those Seeking to commit certain crimes "to leave [their] gun [s] at home").
235 Representative Poff did say that "the prosecution for the basic felony and the
prosecution under my substitute would constitute one proceeding out of which two
separate penalties may grow." 114 CONG. REC. 22,232 (1968). While at first blush
one might interpret this statement as implicating a venue preference, it actually
merely shows that Representative Poff correctly expected that most § 924(c) (1) of-
fenses would occur in the same venue as the predicate crime. And the fact that the
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Congress has amended 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (1) periodically
since its enactment, with a major revision in 1983. 56 In 1983
Congress adopted the Supreme Court's decision in Simpson v.
United States,28 which held that § 924(c) (1) sets out an offense
distinct from the underlying felony and is not simply a penalty
provision.238 The majority's decision, by reading the word "dur-
ing" out of § 924(c) (1) creates nothing more than a simple
penalty provision, thus frustrating congressional intent.239
3. The Verb Test in this Case was an Appropriate Interpretive Tool
Justice Thomas accused the Third Circuit of applying the
verb test "rigidly."240 While acknowledging that such a test works
as a useful interpretive tool, Justice Thomas found that the verb
test, when applied to § 924(c) (1) "unduly limits the inquiry into
the nature of the offense. 241 Justice Thomas, however, failed to
explain how the nature of the offense affects the geographical
positioning of the offense.4 In this case, the correct inquiry is
where the gun was used in relation to the kidnapping, an in-
quiry the verb test answers with precision.24" The Third Circuit
succinctly and appropriately responded to a similar accusation
from their dissent: "Although there may be statutes in which the
verbs defining the statute are ambiguous, 18 U.S.C. § 924 is not
such a statute., 244 The Third Circuit did not rely solely upon the
verb test to reach its conclusion, but used the test merely as an
interpretive tool,245 a tool the Supreme Court conceded to be
appropriate.246
sponsor expected two separate penalties illustrates the intent of § 924(c) (1) to not
simply be a penalty enhancing provision. See Respondent's Brief at 26, Rodriguez-
Moreno (No. 97-1139).
S. REP. No. 98-225, at 313 (1983). See supra notes 49-65 and accompanying text.
27 435 U.S. 6 (1978).
2 Id. at 12.
229 See id. at 10 (holding that Congress did not mean for § 924(c) (1) to be a sen-
tencing enhancement); S. REP. No. 98-225, at 313 (1983).
Rodriguez-Moreno, 119 S. Ct. at 1243.
241 Id.
242 See id.
211 See United States v. Palma-Ruedas, 121 F.3d 841, 849 (3d Cir. 1997).
24 Id. at 850 n.6.
2 See id.
2 See Rodrtiguez-Moreno, 119 S. Ct. at 1242.
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B. THE FRAMERS INTENDED TO LIMIT GOVERNMENTAL POWER
THROUGH THE VENUE CLAUSE
Strikingly, neither the majority nor the dissent in this case
acknowledged the constitutional concerns implicit in the
Court's ruling,247 despite the constitutional boundaries set by the
venue provisions through which the Court navigated. 2 8 Actu-
ally, though, this case provided a tempting opportunity to ig-
nore the constitutional ramifications. First, Rodriguez-Moreno
and his fellow kidnappers/drug pushers are unsympathetic
characters, as painted by the Third Circuit.249 Second, Maryland
is presumably just as foreign as NewJersey to this band of Texas
outlaws, undermining a traditional venue concession of allow-
ing the accused to go through a trial in familiar surroundings.25 0
Finally, because the victim, Avendano, was neither a sympathetic
character nor a resident of Maryland, the citizens of Maryland
would presumably hardly feel slighted by having Rodriguez-
Moreno tried outside of their borders.25' Despite these draw-
backs, the history of the venue provision begs that it not be ig-
nored.2
Though the Framers of the Constitution did not debate ei-
ther the venue or the vicinage provisions of the Constitution,
the Framers most likely included the provisions as a way to limit
federal power. The Declaration of Independence provides
clues leading to the logical determination that those provisions,
among other possible justifications meant to protect the ac-
cused, would be a limiting force upon the power of the federal
government.2 5 4 The Declaration of Independence expressed
217 See id. at 1241-46.
241 See supra notes 5-11 and accompanying text.
219 See Palma-Ruedas, 121 F.3d at 845-47.
"o See supra notes 29-36 and accompanying text. The justification for upholding
the venue provision based on convenience of the accused has been criticized as out-
moded in today's highly mobile society. See Norman Abrams, Conspiracy and Multi-
Venue in Federal Criminal Prosecutions, 9 UCLA L. REV. 751 (1962). Abrams argues that
the venue provision "does not take into account the residence of the accused" and
thus bears "no necessary connection to the location of the victim, witness, documents
or other similar factors." Id. at 817.
" See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
22 See supra notes 12-36 and accompanying text.
23 See supra notes 21-36 and accompanying text.
24 SeeTHE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 16 (U.S. 1776). See also supra notes
21-28 and accompanying text.
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dismay that colonists could be forced to go to England for trial,
and that English soldiers did not have to be tried for their al-
leged crimes within the colonies.25 The royal government, it
was perceived, could determine a likely outcome through the
choice of venue.26 To the colonists, this was unacceptable.27
Thus, the limitation of vicinage and venue to the place where
the crime was committed became an important right protected
by many of the inde pendent colonies, and later by the United
States Constitution.
Further, the right to have a jury from the district where the
crime was committed (the vicinage provision), which has his-
torically been indistinguishable from the right to a proper
venue, was placed in the Sixth Amendment, surrounded by
other rights which limits governmental power, including the
right to a speedy trial, the right to be informed of the govern-
ment's accusation, and the right to counsel. 260 The Supreme
Court in United States v. Johnson261 accepted the logical conclu-
sion that the Framers meant to limit federal power through the
venue and vicinage provisions, finding that compromising the
venue provision of the Constitution could lead to "the appear-
ance of abuses, if not abuses, in the selection of what may be
deemed a tribunal favorable to the prosecution."262 This reason-
ing was later confirmed in Travis v. United States,23 where the
Court held that "venue provisions in Acts of Congress should
not be so freely construed as to give the Government the choice
of a 'tribunal favorable' to it. ,
26
The Supreme Court's decision in this case is constitutionally
dangerous on three levels. First, it allows administrative conven-
ience, even without legislative branch approval, to trump a con-
stitutional right.2 0 Allowing the government to choose the most
2"THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 16 (U.S. 1776).
26 Id.
257 rd.
m See Kershen, supra note 12, at 813.
2" See WRIHr, supra note 7, at 579.
20 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
261 United States v.Johnson, 323 U.S. 273 (1944).
2162 Id. at 275.
263 364 U.S. 631 (1961).
216 Id. at 634 (quotingJohnson, 323 U.S. at 275).
262 Cf United States v. Palma-Ruedas, 121 F.3d 841, 850 (3d Cir. 1997) (noting that
constitutional principles should not easily give way to administrative convenience).
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favorable tribunal for the prosecution places the government in
an inherently better position from which to try the case.2  Con-
versely, the accused will be forced to expend more resources as
evidence and witnesses, which are more likely to be found
where the offense took place, are left behind.26 While this is
appealing from a public policy position, as taxpayers have a
monetary incentive in allowing federal prosecutors to work as
efficiently as possible, the provisions of the Constitution protect-
ing the rights of the accused "should not be hastily balanced
away."26' Giving the government an inherent advantage over the
accused in tribunal choice cuts against the spirit of the venue
guarantees within the Constitution.t s
Second, this decision provides a precedent that invites gov-
ernmental abuse, as the government in similar factual situations
can actively choose the most favorable venue in which to try the
case.270 By allowing the government to try Rodriguez-Moreno in
a jurisdiction of questionable constitutionality, the Court has
implicitly stretched the boundaries within which government
prosecutors work.2 1' The Supreme Court essentially allowed the
government in this case to choose, anywhere along the path
from Texas to New York, the forum in which to try the §
924(c) (1) offense.272 While the prosecutors ostensibly (and
most likely) tried the case simply in the most convenient fo-27S
rum, nothing prohibits the government now from choosing a
274
forum in a similar case for purely strategic reasons. In Corona,
one can imagine that the government felt more comfortable try-
Cf id. ("Essentially the government wants to have the option of venue.., it does
not want to be restricted to trying these cases in the venue where the § 924 violation
occurred.").
27 Kershen, supra note 12, at 810-11.
Palma-Ruedas, 121 F.3d at 850.
.. See Johnson, 323 U.S. at 276.
270 Cf id. (expressing concern that broadening venue could lead to the appearance
of abuse, if not outright abuse).
2" See Brief Amicus Curiae of the National Association of Criminal Defense Law-
yers at 1-2, United States v. Rodriguez-Moreno, 119 S. Ct. 1239 (1999) (No. 97-1139)
(noting that this case "represents an unprecedented and unwarranted expansion of
[the government's] power" to choose venue).
27 See Rodriguez-Moreno, 119 S. Ct. at 1244.
" See Palma-Ruedas, 121 F.3d at 850 n.5.
2' See STORY, supra note 19, § 925 (stating that a purpose of the venue provision
was to guard against being subjected to a jury who may "cherish animosities, or
prejudices" against the accused).
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ing the substantive drug-trafficking charges in the more conser-
vative Nevada, rather than relatively liberal CaliforniaY.2 5 This is
not conceptually different from the time the royal government,
as perceived by the colonists, could determine a probable out-
come through the choice of venue. 6 The venue provisions
were likely enacted to protect against even the appearance of
such abuse. 7
Finally, the Court's decision takes power away from locali-
ties by not protecting a community's right to stage the trial of
local offenses.278 States have traditionally held the balance of
power within the federal system over shaping criminal statutes
in a way that reflects local preferences.27r As the federal gov-
ernment has increasingly encroached into this territory, the
states, through the venue provisions, have at least had the con-
solation of trying the accused with local juries, thus mirroring,
to some extent, local values in a trial's outcome.28 ° Because the
federal government was given the power to choose the venue
for Rodriguez-Moreno's § 924(c) (1) offense, this consolation to
Maryland, however small, was lost.
28'
Realizing the important historical background and compel-
ling justifications within the venue provisions, the Supreme
Court has previously noted that, in criminal cases, the question
of venue is not a legal technicality, but a significant matter of
public policy. 22  Thus, "if an enactment of Congress equally
permits the underlying spirit of the constitutional concern for
trial in the vicinage to be respected rather than to be disre-
spected, construction should go in the direction of constitu-
tional policy. '283 The Supreme Court would have done well to
adhere to its own advice.
In this case, the constitutional concern for proper venue
was not respected by the very court charged with providing such
'5 See supra notes 68-79 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 12-24 and accompanying text.
'n See United States v. Johnson, 323 U.S. 273, 275-76 (1944).
278 SeeAMAR, supra note 23, at 124 & n.163.
27" See id& See also supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text.
280 See supra notes 25-36 and accompanying text.
281 See supra notes 29-36 and accompanying text.
282 Johnson, 323 U.S. at 276 (1944).
2 83 
Id.
21 See United States v. Palma-Ruedas, 121 F.3d 841, 850 (3d Cir. 1997).
982 [Vol. 90
UNITED STATES v. RODRIGUEZMORENO
constitutional protections.2 Thus, where Congress does not
explicitly enact a constitutionally acceptable venue provision,
constitutional concerns should persuade the Court to err on the
side of strict venue interpretation.
286
VI. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court in United States v. Rodriguez-Moreno held
that venue was proper in a prosecution under § 924(c) (1) in
any federal jurisdiction where the underlying crime was com-
mitted.28 7 Because § 924(c) (1) defines a unitary crime with two
distinct elements, according to the majority, it is proper to
prosecute the defendant in any district where the underlying
crime was committed, so long as the gun offense was committed
"during and in relation to" the underlying offense.2 ' s The ma-
jority, though, errs by reading the word "during" out of the stat-
ute, leading to the mistaken conclusion that § 924(c) (1)
presents two separate offenses.2 9 Further, the congressional his-
tory does not support the Court's relaxed reading of the statute
and choice of the verb test as the appropriate interpretive
tool.m Finally, the venue provisions of the Constitution require
deference when the Court adjudicates close cases.291
Because the Supreme Court improperly interpreted §
924(c) (1), and ignored the Constitutional implications of defin-
ing the venue in this case broadly, United States v. Rodriguez-




21 See United States v. Rodriguez-Moreno, 119 S. Ct. 1239, 1244 (1999).
2U See id.
t, See id. at 1245 (Scalia,J., dissenting).
'o See supra notes 226-46 and accompanying text.
"' See United States v. Johnson, 323 U.S. 273, 276 (1944). See also supra notes 282-
86 and accompanying text.
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